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6. LAX  FINANCIAL REGULATION AND NON CO-OPERATIVE COUNTRIES : AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS  
In the previous sections we theoretically analysed the following hypothesis:  a given 
country may find it advantageous to design its financial regulations, to attract capital of illegal 
origin, essentially offering money- laundering services. We have designated these states as LFR 
countries. The LFR countries activities produce benefits for the terrorism and the organised crime.  
A country finds it advantageous to become an LFR country because, in defining its 
objective function, the economic benefits expected from offering money-laundering services are 
greater than the relative expected costs, associated with internal risk of the development of 
terrorism and of organised crime, the international risk of loss of reputation, and the possibility of a 
sanction by the international community.  Therefore, the greater the sensitivity of a country to the 
benefits of money laundering, and the lower its sensitivity to the cost of money laundering, the 
greater is the probability that it will become an LFR country (Proposition One) 
The utility function assumed here must therefore meet these two fundamental 
requirements: insensitivity to the production of pollution (terrorism and/or organised crime) and a 
strong sensitivity  to the benefit of money laundering services supply.  
But what are the economic and institutional characteristics that help define an LFR 
country?  Based on our earlier reflections, being the international contest (i.e. the technical and the 
political enforcement) constant, we can  state that:  
 
* An LFR country will be one that, in terms of economic characteristics, has relatively scant 
physical resources to spend in international trade, and this is an initial channel of national benefit  
expected from lax regulation (Proposition Four); 
* At the same time, an LFR country has the potential for developing financial services, also useful 
for money- laundering purposes, and this is a second channel of national benefit expected from lax 
regulation (Proposition Four); 
* An LFR country also has geographical and social characteristics that shield it to some extent from 
the risks of terrorism and/or of organised crime and, thus reducing the expected cost of lax 
regulation (Proposition Six); 
* An LFR country is relatively indifferent to the expected costs due to international reputation risks 
(Proposition Five). 
 
But, in reality, what category of countries are actually closest to the LFR country model? The 
answer is immediate, thinking of the activities of the FATF. Formed in 1990, the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental body whose objective is to develop and promote 
policies to combat money laundering, a dangerous process aimed at concealing the illegal income 
generated by criminal activities. 
 
The FATF currently has 29 member countries48 and two international organisations 49. Its 
membership therefore includes the principal financial centres of Europe, North and South America 
and Asia. 
It is a multidisciplinary body, a fundamental condition for effectively combating money 
laundering, and possesses the knowledge of experts in legal, financial and economic questions. The 
need to cover all the aspects of the war against money- laundering is reflected in the Forty 
                                                                 
48 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, 
Singapore, Spain, United States, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. 
49 The two international organizations are the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
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Recommendations of the TATF, an instrument which the Task Force decided to adopt and which all 
countries are asked to follow. 
 
These Recommendations were drafted for the first time in 1990, and revised in 1996 to 
incorporate the experience gained in those six years and to reflect the evolution in money 
laundering. They form the working base for the Task Force and an essential framework of 
effectiveness in combating money laundering. In particular, since 22 June 2000, the TATF has been 
publishing a periodic report on non-co-operative countries and territories (NCCTs) in an 
international effort to combat money laundering: the black- list. The report lays down 25 criteria 
(Appendix 1)  for each country that, if violated, identify the national rules that in each country are 
detrimental to international co-operation in the fight against money laundering. These criteria are 
consistent with the Forty Recommendations.  
 
Since June 2000, 45 countries have been monitored (Table 1) , and five black- lists have 
been published (22 June 2000, 22 June 2001, 7 September 2001, 1 February 2002, July 2002) 
indicating the jurisdictions that fail to conform to the criteria: overall, 23 countries have been 
identified as effective  NCCTs at least once (Figure 1). 
 
Analysing the nature of the violations in the NCCTs, country by country, (Table 2)  we 
discover an interesting fact: over 50% of the violations concern deficiencies in financial regulation: 
no or inadequate regulations and supervision of financial institutions, inadequate rules for the 
licensing and creation of financial institutions, inadequate customer identification requirements, 
excessive secrecy provisions regarding financial institutions, and lack of efficient suspicious  
transactions reporting system. 
 
The  principal violations concern the criteria that require that co-operative countries 
have an efficient mandatory system for reporting suspicious or unusual transactions to a competent 
authority, provided that such a system aims to detect and prosecute money laundering (criterion 10), 
the presence internal regulations of monitoring and criminal or administrative sanctions in respect 
to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions (criterion 11), and the presence of a 
centralised financial intelligence unit for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information 
on suspicious transactions to competent authorities (criterion 25). 
 
The NCCTs therefore tend to violate primarily the criteria related to financial 
regulation. It is therefore natural to think that the TATF list of the potential  NCCTs is in reality a 
list of countries that come closest to our theoretical definition of LFR countries.  Furthermore, each 
potential LFR country tends to differ from the others in the number of times it has appeared on the 
black-list and the number of criteria it has violated. So it may be useful to construct a laxity index, 
based on this information, to measure the extent to which a given country is lax in its regulations. 
 
Based on the available information,  we create a Laxity Index, using a two stage process 
(Table 1). First stage: for each country, in every year from 2000 to 2002, each criterion can be 
satisfied, or can be violated fully or only partially. Therefore for each country a weight can be 
assigned to each criterion: 0 for compliance, 0.5 for partial violation, and 1 for total violation 
(Appendix 2). Doing the average of annual criteria violations,  we obtain the a preliminary laxity 
index. Second stage:  given the number and the entity of the violations,  we must consider that each 
country can be more or less permanently on the black list. The presence of each countries can 
potentially range from a maximum of six to a minimum of one. So then, by weighting the respective 
simple laxity index for each country, we can obtain a final  Laxity Index, in which the degree of 
laxity is found by considering both the number and gravity of the violations of the criteria and the 
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more or less transitory presence of the country on the black list. Therefore for the list of  the 
potential 45 LFR countries we can have the Laxity Index. 
 
Having identified a sample of potential LFR countries, it is possible to perform some 
econometric exercises. Using a world-wide data set on the main 130 countries50 (see Table 3 for the 
list),  we do a Probit analysis; the dependent variable is a  Binary Probit Variable, that is equal to 1 
for the 45 potential LFR countries and 0 otherwise.  
The estimated equation is as follows: 
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with Nt K1=  
where:  
 
A1 = Landuse51;  
B1 = GDP per Capita52; 
C1 = Foreign Deposits per Capita53;   
D1= Democracy Index54;  
D2 = Commonwealth Country55;  
E1 = Terrorism and Organised Crime56  Index57. 
                                                                 
50 Given the 267 world countries (UN members=180), our 130 countries (BRI sample) represent the 98% of the world 
GDP and the 90% of the world population. 
51 Landuse: This entry contains the percentage shares of total land area for five different types of land use: arable land 
- land cultivated for crops that are replanted after each harvest like wheat, maize, and rice; permanent crops - land 
cultivated for crops that are not replanted after each harvest like citrus, coffee, and rubber; permanent pastures - land 
permanently used for herbaceous forage crops; forests and woodland  - land under dense or open stands of trees; other - 
any land type not specifically mentioned above, such as urban areas. Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 
52 Gdp-capita: This entry shows GDP on a purchasing power parity basis divided by population (year 2001). Source: 
Central Intelligence Agency 
53 Fordepositscapita: The data of foreign deposits are derived from reporting as such or calculated by subtracting 
separately reported data on positions other than deposits from total external assets and liabilities. The only exception is 
the Netherlands Antilles, which daoes not provide this information separately(year 2001)  Source: BRI. The deposit 
data are then divided by popolatio (year 2001). 
54 Democracy Index:  www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/lobby/3535/country/list-di.htm 
55 Commonwealth Country: dummy variable, equal to 1 if  the country is a Commonwealth member,  0 otherwise. 
56 Regards the Organised Crime Dummy, it's evident that the drug market dimension is an - indirect and imperfect - 
indicator of the organised crime  problems. It is also true that it's the drug market that has given organised crime its 
massive resources. It's has been correctly noted that drugs became, during the 70s, a far too profitable and easy trade for 
even traditional and "conservative" organised crime organisations to ignore. See Rider (2002), pag.17; furthermore, 
there it's also noted that even terrorist groups, entered into the market, and by so doing became virtually 
indistinguishable from "ordinary" organised crime. 
57 Terrorism and Organised Crime Index: we built this variable summing  two separate variables for each country : 
Organised Crime Dummy =  equal to 1 if in the country there are drug production and/or drug markets, 0 otherwise 
(Source: CIA);  Normalised Terrorism Indicator =  average number of  terrorist episodes in the country (years 1968-91)  
/ max average  number of terrorist episodes in a country  (yeras 1968-91); the Terrorism indicator therefore ranges from 
0 to 1 (Source: Blomberg). Consequently, our Index ranges from 0 to 2 
 
Data Sources; Central Intelligence Agency – www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook; Democracy Index – 
www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/3535/country/list -di.htm; Foreign Bank Deposits: Bank for International Settelements – 
www.bri.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0206.pdf#page=44; ;  Terrorism Indicators, see Blomberg B.S., Hess D.G., Weerapana A., Terrorism From Within: An 
Economic Model of Terrorism, May 2002 and  ITERATE Data Set. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =        130 
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =          . 
Log likelihood = -65.094742                       Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
BinaryProbit |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     landuse |   .0055706   .0037493     1.49   0.137    -.0017779    .0129191 
   gdpcapita |  -.0000673   .0000236    -2.85   0.004    -.0001136   -.0000211 
fordeposit~a |   3.40e-06   1.43e-06     2.38   0.017     5.98e-07    6.19e-06 
DandTvaria~e |  -.4496926   .2352834    -1.91   0.056    -.9108397    .0114545 
   democracy |  -.0010027   .0056341    -0.18   0.859    -.0120454    .0100399 
  commwealth |   .2645573   .2975846     0.89   0.374    -.3186979    .8478124 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Marginal effects after probit 
      y  = Pr(BinaryProbit) (predict) 
         =   .7814722 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 landuse  |   .0016431      .00137    1.20   0.230  -.001043  .004329   63.4623 
gdpcapita |  -.0000199      .00001   -2.06   0.039  -.000039 -1.0e-06   11403.8 
fordepts  |   1.00e-06      .00000    9.35   0.000   7.9e-07  1.2e-06    423892 
T&Crime   |  -.1326382      .10291   -1.29   0.197  -.334336  .069059   .627538 
democracy |  -.0002958      .00166   -0.18   0.859  -.003549  .002958   38.9462 
commwealt*|   .0743387         .08    0.93   0.353  -.082459  .231136   .276923 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
 
The regression shows that the probability to be a LFR country will depend on economic  
variables (Proposition One). 
 
Firstly, we have stated that an LFR country will be one that, because of its geographical 
and economic characteristics, has relatively scant physical resources to spend in international trade, 
and this is the first channel of national benefit  expected from lax financial regulation (Proposition 
Four). We note that the  probability that a country became a LFR country tend to be higher: 
 
* the more she experiences economic growth problems, measuring those problems in terms of  
per-capita GDP (significance at 0%)  and the level of land exploitation (significance at 13%); 
 
Secondly, we have affirmed that an LFR country has the possibility of developing its 
offering of financial services, also useful for purposes of money laundering, and this is a second 
channel of national benefit expected from lax financial regulation (Proposition Four) . In this 
regard, we note that the probability that a country became a LFR country tend to be higher: 
 
* the more they have developed the flow of foreign deposits (significance at 1%) 
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Thirdly, we have stated that an LFR country will be one that have no terrorism and/or 
organised crime problems (Proposition Six). In the regression we use a joint Index of the terrorism 
risks and of the organised crime risks. In our approach every national policymaker care about both 
risks, and a lax financial regulation can benefits in principle either terrorism or organised crime. We 
note that the  probability that a country became a LFR country tend to be higher: 
 
    * as the degree of terrorism and organised crime risks decrease (significance at 5%). 
 
Finally, the probability that a country became a LFR country tend to be higher: as  the 
degree of democracy decreases, measured by the Democracy Index (significance at 85%); and if the 
country is  a Commonwealth member (significance at 37%).  We have to highlight that we do not 
find data to  test the role of the  international reputation sensitivity (Proposition Five)58. 
 
Using the same data set, we can also reach some conclusions on the relationships 
between  potential LFR countries and offshore centres. 
 
While there is a theoretical presumption that international tax evasion and money laundering 
through offshore centres should overlap59, there is no need for this to be the case. Map 1 shows the 
list of countries that are currently not complying with the Guidelines of the Financial Action Task 
Force. Table 3  show the countries  that have been identified by the OECD as engaging in Harmful 
Tax Competition. As can be seen by comparing the two black lists, not all tax favoured centres are 
also not compliant with FATF. However, owing to a lax regulatory and supervisory environment 
banks in those countries are considered as potential targets for money laundering. Similarly a 
number of “black listed” locations from a tax standpoint are not NCCTs (non-co-operative countries 
and territories) under FATF. 
 
While this finding may appear to contradict the hypothesis that money laundering and tax 
evasion are intimately related, this is not altogether surprising in light of the criteria utilised for 
constructing the “black lists” for NCCTs and centres engaging in “harmful tax competition”. The  
members of FATF  did not seek to list a series of transactions that could be identified as “money 
laundering” and then seek to identify centres in which such transactions were more likely to occur. 
Rather forty criteria basically relating to the degree of “transparency” of the financial system and to 
the degree of law enforcement were utilised for defining NCCTs. 
  
In drawing up the “black list” FATF was also careful not to avoid a number of complex 
issues, such as the definition of “criminal” activity which can vary from centre to centre. This is 
especially important for “tax evasion” which is treated very differently under the law in various 
jurisdictions. As a consequence, the emphasis on “non transparency”, degree of supervision and law 
enforcement has led to a very disparate series of jurisdictions appearing as NCCTs.  
 
In the case of the OECD “harmful tax competition” studies (1998)  and EU Report of the 
Primarollo Group, the focus was on identifying tax provisions or preferential regimes in some 
instances of a very specific nature or relating to a specific type of industry (for example, shipping). 
The focus was on transactions that could lead to the shifting of the tax base and not necessarily to 
“tax evasion” which entails the concealment of income. The coverage included regimes in OECD 
countries and chapters were dedicated to a number of specific topics: artificial definition of the tax 
                                                                 
58 Obviously we cannot test with a cross-country analysis  the role of international economic and political enforcement, 
that,  in the traditional economic policy point of view,  are variables  no  country specific, while , in a new political 
economy point of view, should be more testable prima facie using country - case studies. 
59 See ALWORTH and MASCIANDARO (2002), YANIV (1994) and (1999). 
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base; failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; foreign source income exempt 
from residence country tax; negotiable tax rates or tax base; existence of secrecy provisions; access 
to a wide network of tax treaties; regimes which are promoted as tax minimisation vehicle;  and 
regimes encourages purely tax-driven operations or arrangements. 
 
There is also another important distinction that can be made between countries engaged in 
Harmful Tax Competition and NCCTs. Given the complexity of many money laundering schemes, 
highly sophisticated intelligence and policing operations may be needed to control and eradicate 
money laundering. This may be difficult for many small centres, particularly because money 
laundering by its very nature involves circumventing the rule of law and small financial centres may 
not have the resources to police these activities. Consequently, the efforts of FATF  aimed at 
improving the workings of the financial systems of small financial centres may at times actually 
assist the development of “more efficient” tax havens. 
 
Therefore, using the same world-wide data set,  we do another  Probit analysis; the 
dependent variable is now a Offshore Binary Probit Variable, that is equal to 1 for the OECD 
offshore countries and 0 otherwise.  
The estimated equation is as follows: 
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with Nt K1=  
 
where:  
 
A1 = Landuse;  
B1 = GDP per Capita; 
C1 = Foreign Deposits per Capita;   
D1= Democracy Index;  
D2 = Commonwealth Country (Dummy variable);  
E1 = Terrorism and Organised Crime Index;  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Probit estimates                                  Number of obs   =        130 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =          . 
Log likelihood = -59.028787                       Prob > chi2     =          . 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dummyOffShore |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     landuse |   .0018127   .0038405     0.47   0.637    -.0057145    .0093399 
   gdpcapita |  -3.79e-07   .0000151    -0.03   0.980      -.00003    .0000293 
fordeposits  |   6.37e-07   5.39e-07     1.18   0.238    -4.20e-07    1.69e-06 
   T&Crime   |  -1.325194   .2739108    -4.84   0.000     -1.86205   -.7883389 
  commwealth |  -.3228179   .2960498    -1.09   0.276    -.9030647     .257429 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Marginal effects after probit 
      y  = Pr(dummyOffShore) (predict) 
         =  .31079773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 landuse |   .0006402      .00135    0.47   0.636  -.002014  .003295   63.4623 
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gdpcap~a |  -1.34e-07      .00001   -0.03   0.980  -.000011   .00001   11403.8 
fordep~a |   2.25e-07      .00000    1.06   0.289  -1.9e-07  6.4e-07    423892 
d0tdummy*|  -.4640011      .07904   -5.87   0.000  -.618913  -.30909   .592308 
commwe~h*|  -.1094256      .09404   -1.16   0.245   -.29375  .074899   .276923 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
It's quite evident that  the regression have not explanatory power. The only exception is 
represented  by the Terrorism and Organised Crime Index: We can say  that the  probability that a 
country became an Offshore centre tend to be higher : 
 
    * as the degree of terrorism and organised crime risks decrease (significance at 0%). 
 
In general, therefore, we can reject the hyphotesis that the causes of LFR decisions and 
of  Offshore activities are the same. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The lax financial regulation problem, favouring the money laundering phenomena,  can 
increase world-wide the risks of terrorism and of organised crime. In this paper we have explored 
theoretically and empirically the issue. 
Theoretically, the degree of financial laxity can be an endogenous variable, determined 
by  the policy maker cost -benefits analysis, depending then on economic and institutional country 
variables, as the growth level, the role of the financial industry, the reputation sensibility, the 
absence of terrorism and/or of organised crime, the institutional attractiveness. 
Empirically, the empirical analysis does not repudiate the theoretical assumption that 
countries, that because of scant resources,   foreign dependence in the offering of financial services, 
and absence  of terrorism and/or organised crime risks,  and perhaps insensitivity to the 
international community judgement,  can derive  net expected national benefits from offering 
laundering services for illicit foreign capital, and therefore can be or become LFR countries.  
The empirical relationships developed are probably interesting but not definitive or 
conclusive. This prompts at least three reflections. In terms of results, we must stress that the 
potential LFR country display uniform economic and institutional elements, bolstering the 
significance of the FATF action, but also marked dissimilarities among them. This suggests two 
indications for designing international policies of prevention and combat. On the one hand, that by 
modifying their formal rules they do not automatically cease to be LFR countries, since the 
incentives for laxity in combating the laundering of illicit capital may be very deep-rooted. On the 
other hand, that the international community can have an impact on those roots through stick-and-
carrot policies tailored to each country, precisely because the degree of laxity and its motivations 
may not be identical in each case.  
On a battlefield where reputation is one of the main weapons, policy makers engaged in 
the fight against international money laundering schemes should be very cautious in taking 
initiatives that may affect the reputation of the actors involved.  A pure “name and shame” approach 
may even prove counterproductive.  Tampering with reputational mechanisms might, at the same 
time, not only miss the target but also reach the wrong target.  First, there is a high risk of false 
negatives, i.e. of including in a hypothetical list of countries that supply money laundering services 
countries that are merely engaged in the offer of financial services of superior quality.  The costs of 
